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Annex 1
Assessment of detection
technologies
The following table presents a schematic, non-exhaustive overview of several landmine and
minefield detection technologies. Some of them have already been fielded, while others stand a
serious chance of being fielded in the near future. There are undoubtedly other technologies
which could find their way into humanitarian demining, such as acoustic/seismic methods (which
seem to possess quite a low false-alarm rate, but are still quite complex, and limited in target
depth as well as detection speed), or other techniques which look appealing mostly for specific
applications (for example, Electrical Impedance Tomography for confirmation tasks in wet
environments).
Most technologies are stand-alone (i.e. they can be used by themselves) but can also be used in
combination with others. Comments on multi-sensor systems are provided where appropriate,
and in a separate section at the end of the table.
In some cases comments on cost factors have been added as well. These have obviously to be
weighted against the benefits derived from the use of the corresponding technology.
The Application Type has been schematically subdivided as: hand-held (HH), vehicle-based (VEH)
and airborne (AIR), as well as in close-in (CI) vs. remote (REM). Although most of the research
carried out so far has focused on the close-in detection of individual mines, wide-area remote
minefield detection methods could be very important for area reduction tasks. The Potential for
HD has been mostly evaluated with respect to the mainstream applications within humanitarian
demining.
The Technology Readiness estimation is a qualitative measure based, as in the EUDEM report
(Bruschini et al), on the known state of advancement of R&D, the demonstration of detection
capabilities useful for humanitarian demining, as well as the demonstration of building a practical
system. The resulting list is undoubtedly subjective. Additional technology readiness estimations
can be found in MacDonald et al and Sahli, Bruschini and Crabbe.
Finally, although the emphasis is here on sensor technologies, it should be noted that a substantial
contribution to improving the efficiency of the demining process has come from Information
and Communication Technologies (ICT), such as information management (e.g. IMSMA) or
positioning systems (GPS, DGPS). In the future we can expect to move towards a coherent
framework in which all available information over a given area is integrated and used, with ICT
such as integrated GIS environments, image interpretation methods, and decision-support
systems, playing a prominent role (Cornelis and Sahli).
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Enhanced Probes/Prodders
Magnetic
Magnetometers
Electromagnetic
EM Induction
(“Metal Detector“)
Ground Penetrating Radar
(GPR)
Microwave Radiometers
Can be implemented either as
passive or active probes (e.g. force
feedback measuring or drilling
probes, respectively), or as sensor-
enhanced tools, including for
example acoustic/ultrasonic sensors
or metal detectors in the tip of the
probe.
Application Type: CI: HH.
Rely on the influence of nearby
ferromagnetic objects, on top of the
Earth’s magnetic field. Are called
gradiometers when used in a
differential arrangement.
Application Type: CI: HH, VEH
(arrays).
A time-varying current in a coil
generates an electromagnetic field,
which induces electric (“eddy”)
currents in metallic objects (kHz to
MHz frequency range3). Effect can be
enhanced for magnetic objects.
Detector “illuminates” an area
roughly as large as the sensor head
(“footprint”).
Application Type: CI: HH, VEH
(arrays).
Detects radio waves reflected off the
mine’s surface(s), the amount of
reflected energy depending also on
the mine’s size and shape. Works as
a target-soil electrical contrast sensor
in a slightly smaller frequency band
than cellular phones/microwave
ovens (GHz frequency range).Can
produce a fuzzy depth “image” by
scanning the suspected area, and/or
using an antenna array.
Application Type: CI: HH, VEH
(arrays).
Passive sensor, works like a power
meter in the microwave band
(similar frequency range as GPR -
GHz range), measuring the
microwave radiation coming from
an object. Relies on the microwave
“temperature” contrast between the
“warm” ground and a “cold” mine.
Application Type: CI: HH, VEH.
REM: possible for large surface laid
objects.
Technology Operating Principle/
Application Type1
Enhancements of currently used and
well known manual tools.
Force feedback probes signal when
excessive force is exerted. Drilling
probes can be used to enhance
penetration in hard soils.
Sensor enhanced probes are meant to
be used for target recognition (e.g.
plastic, rock or metal).
Very sensitive devices. Are routinely
employed to detect large
ferromagnetic objects such as UXO
and can be effective at depths of
several metres. Gradiometers remove
the background due to the earth’s
own magnetic field, and other
disturbances.
Well established technology (HH;
vehicle-based arrays are more recent
developments).
Indicative detection limits (can also
depend on ground conditions):
shallow (about 10-15cm for
minimum-metal mines, 20-30cm for
mines with an appreciable metallic
content, and 50-70cm for UXO and
metallic mines).
Greater depths reachable with large
loop systems.
Capable of detecting entirely non-
metallic objects (e.g. minimum-metal
mines).
Well established for a number of
applications (civil engineering,
geology, archaeology).
Can provide target depth
information.
Could be very useful in stand-alone
mode for selected applications (e.g.
deep minimum-metal anti-tank
mines).
Is rather insensitive to small metallic
debris.
Most GPR use very low power and do
not present any radiation hazard.
Surface or shallowly buried objects,
e.g. as a complement to GPR.
Detection depth depends strongly on
operating frequency, soil humidity
and conductivity, mine case (metal or
plastic) and size (large anti-tank are
much easier to detect than small anti-
personnel mines).
Best results likely for large metallic
objects in dry soils.
In principle simpler than GPR.
Strengths
Table of technologies
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Limitations Potential for HD/
Estimated Technology
Readiness2
Hard ground and other soil objects
(e.g. rocks).
Depending on the sensing
modality, physical contact with the
target may still be necessary.
Sensor enhanced tools (“smart
probes”) will be much more
expensive than ordinary tools.
(For demining) Do not react to non-
ferromagnetic targets.
Magnetic (e.g. laterite rich) or
strongly conductive soils. Ground
compensation techniques can
reduce detector sensitivity.
Very small (minimum-metal
mines) and/or deep targets, low
conductivity metals (e.g. stainless
steel).
Footprint size decreases with depth
(conical footprint).
Electromagnetic interference (e.g.
power lines).
High false alarm rate caused by
metal fragments, etc.
Wet and/or clay rich soils
(increasing attenuation of radio
waves).
Soil inhomogeneities (roots, rocks,
water pockets), strongly uneven
ground surfaces, soil moisture
profile fluctuations.
Very dry soils when looking for
plastic objects (reduced electrical
contrast).
Small anti-personnel mines present
a considerable challenge.
Need to balance resolution (better
at higher frequencies) with depth
penetration (better at lower
frequencies).
Less effective in wet soils. Clear
depth limitations.
Need to balance resolution (better
at higher frequencies) with depth
penetration (better at lower
frequencies).
Has to be protected from radio
frequency interference.
Although potential looks interesting,
in particular for simple modifications
(force feedback and drilling tools)
and/or for training purposes, no
deployment seems to have taken
place so far.
Estimated Technology Readiness:
High.
Well established technology. Are
only used in humanitarian demining
when a real need exists (e.g. UXO
only, or deeply buried UXO).
Estimated Technology Readiness:
High.
Well established technology.
Efficiency limited by metallic debris
(metal – not mine! – detector). Recent
improvements in soil signal
suppression (fielded systems).
Appealing but challenging
innovations: target identification and
parameter estimation (e.g. target
depth/size), imaging applications,
and sensors other than coils.
Estimated Technology Readiness:
(enhanced MDs) Medium-High.
Most mature of all alternative
technologies, subject of extensive
studies and trials. Preferred
combination is with MD.Advanced
HH prototypes now available for
extensive testing. Depending on the
configuration, the GPR can be
confirmatory after the MD, to reduce
its false alarm rate.Vehicle-based
systems mostly developed and tested
for military applications (especially
route clearance).
Estimated Technology Readiness:
Medium-High.
Integration with GPR possible (can
use same antenna).Potential for HD
seems limited.Active systems
possible (“illuminate” target with
microwaves), may offer enhanced
contrast.
Estimated Technology Readiness:
Medium.
1. HH: Hand-held, VEH: Vehicle-
based, AIR: Airborne; CI: Close-in
detection, REM: Remote detection.
2. L: Low, M: Medium, H: High.
3. 1 kHz=1000 Hz=1000 times/
second. 1 MHz=1000 kHz,
1GHz=1000 MHz.
4. Bulk explosive detection
techniques a llow the direct
detection of a macroscopic mass of
explosive material.
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Technology Operating Principle/
Application Type1
Strengths
Trace Explosive Detection
Bulk Explosive Detection4 /
Electromagnetic
(Nuclear) Quadrupole
Resonance (NQR)
Bulk Explosive Detection /
Neutron Based
Neutron Backscattering
Aims at replacing, or at least
complementing, mine detection
dogs (artificial “dog’s nose”).
Principle is the identification of
microscopic residues of the
explosive compound, either in
vapour or in particulate form (or
both).
Sample acquisition — of the air,
vegetation or soil — is crucial.
Filtering to increase concentration
is possible.
A sample has to be acquired in the
field. It can then be directly used in
a portable detector, or has to be
transported to the analytical device
in the REST (Remote Explosive
Scent Tracing) approach. (REST is
already used by some
organisations with dogs, e.g. for
road verification.)
Application Type: CI or REM.
NQR is an electromagnetic
resonance screening technique
used to detect certain chemical
elements such as Nitrogen 14 (14N ),
a constituent of explosives found in
landmines.
A low-intensity radio frequency
signal is applied to the material, in
a frequency range slightly higher
than metal detectors. The
alignment of the 14N nuclei is
altered. The nuclei then return to
their original state, producing a
characteristic radio signal
(detection is similar to tuning a
radio to a particular station).
Coils similar to those of metal
detectors are used.
Application Type: CI: HH (power
issues), VEH (especially for anti-
tank mines on roads).
Fast neutrons are shot into the
ground and slowed down by
collisions with light nuclei — in
particular hydrogen — in the soil and
in the mine’s explosive (and casing
if plastic). Some of the resulting slow
neutrons come back and are detected,
providing a measure of the
hydrogen content of the material.
Explosives and plastics are more
hydrogen-rich than average (dry)
soil.
Application Type: CI: HH, VEH
possible.
Can potentially detect picogram
(1:1012 grams) level samples of
explosive material at the detector, or
ppt (parts per trillion, 1:1012)
concentrations. At least in one case
(Nomadics FIDOTM) even greater
sensitivities have been achieved in
the field for TNT, possibly
comparable to those of dogs.
Comparisons are often carried out
with dogs (e.g. Nomadics) – however,
there does not seem to be general
agreement yet on how dogs manage
to find mines and what they are
actually sniffing.
Trace detection is in routine use in
other applications (e.g. aviation
security).
NQR is a derivative of (Nuclear)
Magnetic Resonance, which is
routinely used for example in
medical diagnostics, without the need
for an external magnetic field.
The chemical structure of the object
under analysis, and therefore the
uniqueness of a molecule’s electric
field, allows NQR technology to be
highly compound specific (each
explosive has a unique signature).
NQR has potentially a very low false
alarm rate.
NQR is being investigated for other
security related applications (e.g.
aviation security).
No nuclear radiation is involved.
Probably the simplest neutron-based
technique; can use a weak radioactive
source.
Can be integrated with a metal
detector in HH equipment.
Similar devices are in use in a
number of other fields (e.g.
petroleum industry).
Fast neutrons can penetrate a few cm
of steel (e.g. UXO).
Imaging might be achievable, to
reduce the false alarm rate.
Table of technologies
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Limitations Potential for HD/
Estimated Technology
Readiness2
Trace quantities available for
detection might very largely vary
in quantity and quality (substance
types) in similar situations, and
can be very small.
Explosive fate and transport in
soil: complex effects, strongly
dependent on any water flow
(large influence of environmental
parameters). Weather and soil
conditions can lead to samples not
being reproducible. Direct vapour
detection seems to be more
difficult in arid areas.
Cross contamination and handling
issues are of great importance —
experimental conditions can be
hard to control/reproduce.
Possible problems due to
interfering chemicals, and
explosives residues due to devices
which have detonated.
Detection times are of a few
seconds to tens of seconds,
depending on type, quantity and
depth of the target substance.
Impossible to detect substances
fully screened by metallic
enclosures, e.g. within UXO.
Detecting TNT is much harder than
RDX.
Weak signals — signal averaging,
shielding and active cancellation
of interference are necessary,
including radio frequency
interference and spurious signals
due to piezoelectric responses
from silica in the soil (quartz).
TNT cast in mines is usually a
solid solution of different
crystalline forms, which can affect
the characteristic frequency
response.
As water is nothing but hydrogen
and oxygen, this technique will
stop working starting from a
given soil humidity.
Soil non-homogeneities and
surface variations can cause false
alarms.
Limited target burial depth.
Shielding is required if the source
strength is increased.
Strong potential for area reduction
(declare an area free of
contamination) and verification,
rather than the detection of
individual mines.
Up to now most sensors either have
insufficient sensitivity, are too slow
or too large to be used in routine
field applications. Even if sufficient
sensitivities are achieved, extensive
field trials are necessary to establish
an appropriate methodology.
The possibility of detecting traces of
explosive- and/or mine-related
substances, as well as surface or soil
sampling, might also be well worth
considering in the future.
Estimated Technology Readiness:
Medium-High.
For confirmation type of
applications.
Very promising for RDX and tetryl,
and/or confirmation of shallow-
buried plastic-cased anti-tank mines.
Power requirements are
considerable and complicate the
design of HH equipment.
Application for small buried anti-
personnel mines still appears to be
extremely elusive for TNT
(unfortunately TNT is much more
common than RDX in landmines!).
As electronic systems become
cheaper and more powerful it may
be possible to substantially improve
performance in the future.
Estimated Technology Readiness:
Medium.
Is adapted to dry or slightly humid
environments.
Working with radioactive sources,
although routine in other
applications, requires a certain
number of precautions.
More likely to be used for
confirmation rather than detection.
Estimated Technology Readiness:
Medium
1. HH: Hand-held, VEH: Vehicle-
based, AIR: Airborne; CI: Close-in
detection, REM: Remote detection.
2. L: Low, M: Medium, H: High.
3. 1 kHz=1000 Hz=1000 times/
second. 1 MHz=1000 kHz,
1GHz=1000 MHz.
4. Bulk explosive detection
techniques a llow the direct
detection of a macroscopic mass of
explosive material.
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Technology Operating Principle/
Application Type1
Strengths
Neutron Analysis
Remote Sensing Techniques
(Electro-)Optical
Multi-Sensor Systems
Other neutron based systems are
composed of a neutron source to
produce the neutrons that have to
be directed into the ground, and a
detector to characterize the outgoing
radiation, usually gamma rays
(high energy X-rays), resulting
from the interaction of the neutrons
with the soil and the target.
Fast Neutron Analysis (FNA) is
based on the interaction of fast
neutrons. Thermal Neutron
Analysis (TNA) relies on slow
neutrons, which can be produced
by slowing down fast neutrons
from small radioisotopic sources,
or from portable electronic neutron
generators.
A number of derivatives of these
techniques exist.
Application Type: CI: VEH.
Earth surface remote imaging with
sensors working in the visible,
Infrared (IR) and/or Ultraviolet
(UV), to detect characteristic image
features. In some circumstances can
also detect anomalies in the light
emitted or reflected by soil and
vegetation patches above buried
mines (soil disturbances and
vegetation stress).Performances can
be increased by using multi- or
hyperspectral cameras, which
operate over several wavelength
bands and provide more
information than images from
common broadband cameras. Other
remote sensing techniques are
sometimes added (e.g. radar).
Application Type: REM: AIR, VEH.
Combination of several sensors in
order to exploit complementary
information. Is in fact already
implemented in the field when
combining manual methods with
metal detectors and/or mine
detection dogs.
Some multi-sensor (MS) systems
can be made HH. VEH MS
platforms are meant to be used for
rapid surveying of large areas, in
particular roads or moderately off-
road areas. Airborne MS platforms
can be used for the previously
described remote sensing
applications.
Fast neutrons can penetrate a few cm
of steel (e.g. UXO).
FNA: by characterising the outgoing
gamma rays it is possible to calculate
the elemental proportions (how much
of each element Carbon, Nitrogen,
Oxygen) is present with respect to the
others) — in order to determine the
type of substance under analysis (all
explosives are composed of C, N, O,
and Hydrogen that is not detectable
by pure FNA, in different
proportions).
TNA is based on the detection of
characteristic gamma rays emitted by
the nitrogen nuclei, and features high
sensitivity to nitrogen concentration.
(Explosives are more nitrogen-rich
than average soil.)
FNA has the potential of delivering
better results than TNA.
Aerial remote sensing in general
enables reduced scan time (wide area
detection).
Infrared (heat) sensing can detect the
thermal contrast between a mine and
the surrounding soil (due to
differences in thermal conductivity).
Multispectral imaging has the
advantage of measuring different
physical parameters simultaneously,
and without major spatial co-
registration problems.
A number of techniques, such as
change detection, multi-temporal
analysis and image fusion, can be
used to extract features from the
recorded (high-resolution) images,
including space-borne imagery.
Underlying rationale: exploitation of
different sensing principles leads to
more reliable detection/classification
results by combining different pieces
of incomplete or imperfect
information.
Use of a confirmation sensor can
simplify system design and analysis,
and come closer to current
“sequential” operational procedures.
Some requirements, such as power
consumption, can be relaxed for VEH
applications.
Table of technologies
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Limitations Potential for HD/
Estimated Technology
Readiness2
1. HH: Hand-held, VEH: Vehicle-
based, AIR: Airborne; CI: Close-in
detection, REM: Remote detection.
2. L: Low, M: Medium, H: High.
3. 1 kHz=1000 Hz=1000 times/
second. 1 MHz=1000 kHz,
1GHz=1000 MHz.
4. Bulk explosive detection
techniques a llow the direct
detection of a macroscopic mass
of explosive material.
Cost, power consumption, the
radiation hazard or the size and
weight of the dense shielding
required, safety, sensitivity and
the practicalities of deployment
are important issues.
Expensive detectors and high-
intensity neutron sources must
often be used to assure adequate
sensitivity. Depth of penetration
has to be carefully assessed, as
well as minimum amount of
detectable explosive.
TNA is relatively slow (second or
even minute response times). FNA
is usually far more complex and
expensive than TNA. The complex
spectral background due to soil
has also to be considered.
Soil and other background signals
can overwhelm the target signal.
Not specific to explosive molecule
(unlike NQR).
Image processing capabilities can
be crucial; large amounts of data.
It can be very difficult to
differentiate a mine from the
background (in particular AP
mines) due to low contrast and the
presence of highly textured
backgrounds. (But this does not
necessarily represent an
insurmountable obstacle to the
detection of minefields as a whole.)
Some imaging results can depend
quite heavily on environmental
conditions, and degrade with
increased mine emplacement time.
Expensive hardware and infra-
structure. Setting-up a
measurement campaign can be
quite complex.
Risk: combining insufficiently
mature sensors can yield an even
more complicated problem than
pushing individual sensor
technologies up to their intrinsic
physical detection limits.
Sub-optimal sensor fusion if
introduced too late in a system’s
development.
Increased system, and performance
evaluation, complexity.
When using a confirmation sensor,
the overall detection probability
(PD) cannot be made larger than
the PD of the primary sensor.
Neutron analysis systems could
typically be combined with other
sensors, and be used in a confirmatory
role, in particular for the detection of
anti-tank mines on roads.
It remains to be established if such a
system will be practical and fieldable,
and if the added performance will be
sufficient to justify the extra costs even
in specialist applications.
Estimated Technology Readiness:
(mostly) Medium.
The focus of remote sensing for HD
applications has moved over the years
from the detection of individual mines
(e.g. from IR images) to mapping/
identification of suspect areas and
minefield delineation for area
reduction and clearance planning, via
the detection of direct and indirect
“minefield indicators” (e.g. changes in
infrastructure and agricultural land use,
minefield fencing, trenches, paths,
detours, etc.), combined with collected
ancillary information and prior
knowledge/intelligence. These
applications have a very high potential
for HD.
Estimated Technology Readiness: High.
Most useful if the sensor fusion can
guarantee that a MS system at least
retains the PD of each single sensor,
and moreover reduces the false alarm
statistics. And also if the user interface
can be kept reasonably simple, as well
as system calibration.
Possible solution to avoid full data
fusion: use one of the sensors as
primary detector (typically the MD)
and another as a confirmatory sensor
(e.g. GPR or explosive detection
system).
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